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ANNUAL SURVEY OF TENNESSEE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW- 1959 TENNESSEE SURVEY
HAROLD SELIGMAN*
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF ArimNSTRATIVE AGENCIES-CONSTITUTIONALITY
II. SCOPE OF REVIEw OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
III. MANDAMUS
IV. LEGISLATION
The subject of administrative law in Tennessee remained generally
static in the year in review. The supreme court held consistently to
its line of decisions concerning review of administrative actions in the
limited number of decided cases concerning the subject. The 1959
General Assembly of Tennessee made some sweeping revisions in the
organization of several departments of government and various
agencies and boards but these changes were solely for purposes of
administrative efficiency and economy with no practical jurisdictional,
regulatory or substantive effect.
I. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-CONSTITUTIONALITY
Although the case of Livesay v. Tennessee Bd. of Examiners in
Watchmaking1 does little more than possibly indicate an announce-
ment by the supreme court that bureaucracy must ultimately have
a stopping point, the reasoning by which the decision was reached
was interesting. This case tests the constitutionality of a law2 which
established a board of examiners for those persons engaged in the
occupation of*watchmaking. The court finds this case to be one of first
impression on the ground that there has been no other case involving
watchmakers in Tennessee. This finding totally disregards the pre-
vious decisions handed down relating to the myriad boards and
bureaus created by legislative enactment. The question in the case
turns upon the application of police power rules to determine the
issue of the constitutionality of the creating act, and the court finds
the watchmaking occupation is not subject to the rule. The court
concludes that if the opportunity for a dishonest person to defraud
a customer were justification for the regulation by the legislature,
then every conceivable business could be regulated. Although the
* Former General Counsel, Tennessee Public Service Commission; member,
Warner & Seligman, Nashville, Tennessee.
1. 322 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1959).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-1401 to -1410 (Supp. 1959).
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legislature deemed it necessary to regulate the qualifications of
watchmakers, the court states it is unable to imagine how the public
welfare will be promoted by the creation of the board. In effect the
court appears to be exercising its judgment as to whether the act is
in the public interest. This point is pertinent in light of some of the
past pronouncements of the court in deciding the constitutional ques-
tion of legislative enactment. At almost the other extreme the
supreme court has stated that in determining the constitutionality
of an act, it is not concerned with whether the act was dictated by
a wise or foolish policy or whether it will ultimately go down to
the public good, as these considerations are solely for the legislature.3
In the case of Motlow v. State,4 the court reserved the right to
pass on the constitutionality of statutes, but in so doing it stated that
it will not inquire into the policy of the legislature if there is any
plausible reason back of the legislation. The Motlow decision was
recently cited on this point in Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Northing-
ton.5 The supreme court recently stated in Phillips v. State,6 in up-
holding the constitutionality of a law forbidding daylight saving time,
that the police power rule embraces all matters reasonably deemed
necessary or expedient for the safety, health, morals, comfort, private
happiness, domestic peace and public welfare of the people. As the
court also stated in the Motlow case, an innocent activity may be
regulated or prohibited if its pursuit offers opportunity for fraud or
deception.7 Thus, while the court in the past has left to the wisdom
of the legislature those professions and occupations which are to be
regulated and sought only to determine whether or not the consti-
tution has been violated through their enactment, in the Livesay
case it would appear that the court interjects itself to protect the
public from the continued creation of boards and agencies.
8
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
During the survey year the Tennessee Supreme Court decided
three cases reviewing decisions of the Tennessee Public Service
Commission. All three were proceedings involving motor carriers
3. Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177 (1912).
4. Ibid.
5. 201 Tenn. 541, 300 S.W.2d 911 (1957).
6. Phillips v. State, 304 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn. 1947). See also Nashville C. &
St. L. R.R. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 429 (1934); Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co.,
103 Tenn. 421, 441-42, 53 S.W. 955, 960 (1899); Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. 287,
310 (1871).
7. See also McCanless v. State ex rel. Hamm, 181 Tenn. 308, 181 S.W.2d
154 (1944).
8. For discussion of the subject matter generally, see 33 AM. Jua. Licenses
§ 17 (1941). Also, for discussion of the delegation of power generally, see
1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 2.10 (1958).
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and in each the decision of the Commission was upheld. Some con-
fusion might exist due to the fact that two of the cases are styled
precisely the same9 and were decided and reported by the court at
the same time, although they involved different parties and different
subject matter. In the first case, Blue Ridge Transp. Co. v. Hammer,0
the court reviewed a decision which construed or interpreted the
scope of operating rights of a motor carrier holding a certificate of
convenience and necessity previously issued by the Commission.
This case involves Gasoline Transport Company which company was
issued a certificate in the year 1945 authorizing the transportation of
petroleum products over certain regular routes between given points
in Tennessee. Subsequently a controversy as to whether the certificate
authorized Gasoline Transport Co. to operate over irregular routes"
was brought before the Commission for determination. The Com-
mission interpreted the certificates to be sufficiently broad as to
authorize the carrier to travel over all highways within the general
area over irregular routes. On appeal, the lower court found that
the interpretation by the Commission was too broad and interfered
with the rights of the appellant, Blue Ridge Transportation Co. The
supreme court followed its numerous recent pronouncements 12 that,
if there is material evidence to support the finding of the Commis-
sion, the Commission's order will be upheld, and so reversed the hold-
ing of the chancellor below. In this case the court appears to have
taken one step further in limiting its review of a decision of an ad-
ministrative agency through its statement that, "It has been the policy
of this Court to give every reasonable presumption in favor of the law-
fulness of the Commission's order .... ,,13 By giving every presumption
9. Blue Ridge Transp. Co. v. Hammer, 313 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1958); Blue
Ridge Transp. Co. v. Hammer, 313 S.W.2d 433 (Tenn. 1958). The style of
the case comes about by the party bringing suit whose name becomes the
complainant and most frequently a contraction of the individual members
of the Commission serving in their official capacity, using the Commission
chairman's individual name as a reference. The two cases decided here,
coincidentally, were styled the same and reported on succeeding pages.
10. 313 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1958).
11. Irregular routes are generally referred to as being over any and all
highways within a given area, while regular route authority specifies a
particular highway over which carrier must travel between its points.
12. Continental Tenn. Lines v. Fowler, 199 Tenn. 365, 287 S.W.2d 22 (1956);
Louisville & N. R.R. v. Fowler, 198 Tenn. 266, 271 S.W.2d 188 (1953);
Hoover Motor Express v. Hammer, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1952). For
recent decisions of other jurisdictions on this point, see Railway Express v.
Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 265 Ala. 369, 91 So. 2d 489 (1956); Parrish v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 134 Colo. 192, 301 P.2d 343 (1956); Woodside Transfer
& Storage Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 212 Ga. 625, 94 S.E.2d 706
(1956); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Indiana Bell Tel., 235 Ind. 1, 130 N.E.2d
467 (1955); Public Serv. Comm'n v. Boone Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 202, 138
N.E.2d 4 (1956); State ex rel. Olson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 133 Mont. 104,
308 P.2d 633 (1957); Petition of Stowell, 125 A.2d 807, 119 Vt. 298 (1956).
See generally 4 DAvis, ADmInISTRATVE LAW §§ 29.01 to .03 (1958).
13. 313 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tenn. 1958).
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in favor of the lawfulness of the Commission's order, the court appears
to be limiting its review not to whether there is substantial and
material evidence to uphold the order of the Commission, but simply
to a determination of whether any material evidence exists, and
then giving the benefit of every doubt or presumption to the Com-
mission.
This point is again quite plainly brought out in the second Blue
Ridge Transp. Co. v. Hammer,14 which involved the grant of certifi-
cates of convenience and necessity to two contract haulers15 over
the objection of certain already certified common carriers. In up-
holding the Commission's decision in that case, the court states very
clearly that, unless there is a plain abuse of discretion by the Com-
mission, its orders will not be disturbed on appeal. The court goes on
to describe the Commission as a fact-finding body with trained ex-
perts, and in evaluating evidence the court says it must give due
consideration to the discretion of the Commission. In upholding the
decision in this case, the supreme court goes one step further and
points out that "more especially" where the chancellor has considered
the record on the common law writ of certiorari, and affirmed the
order of the Commission, this concurrent finding is conclusive of
the issue. The court appears to be saying that where the chancellor
upholds the decision of the Commission review is for all practicality
at an end. It would appear that this wording imposes somewhat on
the statute16 which provides that any aggrieved party may secure
a review of any final judgment of the chancery court by direct appeal
to the supreme court, notwithstanding the provisions of any other
statute to the contrary. The holding in this case would seem to
almost foreclose this appeal which is a matter of right under statute
in cases even where the chancellor below has upheld the Commission.
The court brushes aside the question of whether or not the Com-
mission gave reasonable consideration to the transportation service
being performed by other carriers as provided by statute 7 by saying
that such contention was not supported by the record and the contrary
was conclusively presumed. The court in the instant case states that
there is no mandatory direction for the refusal of a contract hauler's
permit and such a matter is left to the discretion of the Commission
as a fact-finding body.
14. 313 S.W.2d 433 (1958).
15. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1502(c) (1956). A contract carrier is one which
may transport for hire only limited specified commodities under special
contract for one or more shippers.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1502(b) (1956). A common carrier is one obligated
to render service in the area or over the routes for which it holds a certificate
to any person tendering traffic.
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-230 (1956).
17. TENN. CODE ANN. §65-1507(a) (1956).
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Probably the most far reaching of the three cases decided is that of
Refiners Transp. Co. v. Pentecost,18 which involved the application of
a carrier for a certificate of convenience and necessity to transport
liquid petroleum gas to all points within the State of Tennessee.
The applicant in the case, Frank C. Martin, d/b/a Martin Propane
Transport, had a single base of operation, namely, McMinnville,
Tennessee, and testified at the hearing that he had talked to a large
number of the distributors of liquid gas in Tennessee and had found
that there was a definite need for the type of intrastate carrier service
proposed to be furnished. Four distributors of liquid gas who appeared
as witnesses supporting the applicant testified that they needed the
service whether it was furnished by Martin or common carriers.
Protestant carriers appeared testifying as to the availability of their
equipment and their willingness and desire tp render the service.
The court unhesitatingly found there was substantial evidence to
support the decision of the Commission and recited the self-serving
statement of witness Martin as uncontradicted proof. This decision
is in extreme contrast to those decisions entered by the Interstate
Commerce Commission for carriers seeking interstate authority under
similar statutes.19 The supreme court in an earlier case involving
the review of a grant of a certificate to a motor carrier stated in
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n,20 that,
since the Tennessee statutes creating the Public Utilities Commission
were modeled on the federal statutes, the federal decisions are par-
ticularly persuasive involving questions arising under those statutes.
In reviewing decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission on
this point, it has been held that the burden of proof is upon the
applicant 2' and it must be affirmatively shown that existing author-
ized carriers cannot perform the services satisfactorily before grant
of additional authority.22 The Interstate Commerce Commission has
gone further to state that the applicant for authority must show
that the supporting shipper has tried and failed to obtain service
or that the service, when provided, was unsatisfactory.23 The Tennessee
statute24 similarly provides that the burden of proof shall be on
the party or parties asserting the affirmative of an issue. To the
practitioner this case appears to be one of the weakest from the
standpoint of proof as to convenience and necessity which has been
18. 325 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1959).
19. 64 Stat. 574 (1951), 49 U.S.C. § 306 (1952).
20. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
21. Sinnett v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 37 (D.N.J. 1955).
22. Clyde R. Savers, 61 M.C.C. 65 (1952).
23. Warren Transport, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 241 (1956); John G. Miller, 61 M.C.C.
631 (1953).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-209 (e) (1956).
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offered for a statewide operation. No economical feasibility appears to
be shown, yet the supreme court reiterates its consistent position that
it will not disturb the findings of the Commission on matters in which
it has exercised its discretion.
III. MANDAMUS
In the case of Neas v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers' Ass'n,25
certain tobacco growers brought a mandamus proceeding against the
growers' association, which was an agent of the Commodity Credit
Corporation, for the distribution of certain monies held by the
association for the benefit of the growers. The association maintained
that until such time as it saw fit to distribute the cash, it has the
right to use the surplus monies for its own purposes as an association.
Both the chancellor and the supreme court found that mandamus
would lie in such a case for the association had only to perform a
ministerial duty involving no discretion which it was already bound
to perform. The court held, in effect, that this was on all fours with
the case of Range v. Tennessee Burley Tobacco Growers' Ass'n,20 in
which Similar action was taken and that said case was binding on
the issue.
IV. LEGISLATION
The General Assembly of Tennessee passed a sweeping reorganiza-
tion act 27 in which certain of the administrative departments, com-
missions, boards and agencies of the state government were re-
organized, consolidated and transferred. The express purpose of the
enactments was for efficiency and economy. Various of the boards
and agencies were renamed, some placed in different divisions or
departments, but little or no change was made affecting the public
generally other than the possible economies of operation to the state
government. To the public this reorganization act is basically a
renaming of the roses. Two laws were passed relative to the regula-
tion of motor vehicles under the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Public
Service Commission. The new enactment of primary interest 28 re-
peals that provision of the Motor Carrier Act,29 which allows a motor
carrier holding two certificates of convenience and necessity to tack
them together and serve the extreme terminii of both certificates.
This law was commonly referred to as the "Joe Davis" Act and
25. 321 S.W.2d 802 (Tenn. 1959).
26. 298 S.W.2d 545 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
27. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-301 to -304, 4-309, 4-314 to -315, 4-317, 4-323,
4-326, 4-328 to -332, 4-338 to -340, 8-2301, 10-101 to -102, 43-610, 58-401,
63-101 (Supp. 1959).
28. Tennessee Public Acts 1959, ch. 248.
29. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1508 (1955).
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originally passed in 1937 to aid an individual carrier who could not
otherwise acquire authority.
A second enactment 30 of very limited application exempts from
regulation a limited number of motor carriers transporting petroleum
products. This law was passed solely to exclude from regulation
certain oil companies which had undertaken to allow their dis-
tributors to transport products for which they were paid a trans-
portation charge without the necessity for regulation by the Tennessee
Public Service Commission. At best the act is so ambiguous as to be
difficult of interpretation for it exempts "any motor vehicle presently
operating pursuant to a consignment contract," leaving the obvious
question of whether the motor vehicle presently operating refers to
specific pieces of equipment or to a limited class of persons conducting
operations at the time of the passage of the enactment.
A law was passed completely reorganizing the Board of Cosmetol-
ogy31 but without making any substantial changes in its existence
as an administrative agency.
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-1503 (Supp. 1959).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-401 to -402, 62-404 to -406, 62-409 to -410,
62-412, 62-415 to -422, 62-425 to -426 (Supp. 1959).
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